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Abstract 
This study investigates determinants of property tax performance across 47 counties in Kenya. We aim to 
contribute to limited empirical research in developing countries on factors contributing to low property tax 
performance. Though property tax is considered ideal for sub-national governments, its performance in Kenya is 
not only low but its share in both gross domestic product and own-source revenues are declining. There is 
growing consensus among fiscal decentralization experts that adequate own-source revenue for sub-national 
governments is a precondition for successful fiscal decentralization. In 2010 Kenya promulgated a new 
Constitution that mandates sub-national governments with more fiscal responsibilities; hence performance of 
property tax in Kenya is of immense policy interests than ever before. Past policy efforts to reform property tax 
in Kenya has hardly yielded positive results. The results show that urbanization, population density and 
administration capacity are key factors explaining property tax performance across the Kenyan counties. The 
results have implications for developing countries in terms of design of horizontal revenue sharing, and the need 
to enhance administration capacity for sub-national governments.  
Key words: Property tax, developing countries, Kenya 
1. Introduction  
Ability to generate adequate own-source revenues by sub-national governments is a precondition for successful 
fiscal decentralization (Bird, 2011; Kelly, 2000; Olowu and Wunsch 2003). Sub-national governments in Kenya 
are however characterized by low own-source revenues as they heavily rely on transfers from the national 
government. Indeed, 60 percent of sub-national governments in Kenya have their expenditure financed by 
transfers from national government in excess of 50 percent (Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2013). 
Property tax is favorite own-source revenue for sub-national governments, largely due to immobility of tax base 
and predictability of revenues (McCluskey et al, 2013). However, low productivity of property taxes in 
developing countries is of immense policy interests (Kelly, 2000; McCluskey et al, 2013). Property tax 
performance in Kenya is declining both in terms of contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and share in 
own-source revenues for sub-national governments (Kelly, 2000, 2004).   
Globally property taxes account for 40-80 percent of own-source revenues for sub-national governments and 0.5-
3 percent of GDP (Kelly 2000a), while in developing countries the figures hardly reach 40 percent and 0.5 
percent, respectively (Youngman and Malme, 1994). More recently, property tax as a percent of GDP in 
developing countries is estimated at 0.6 percent compared to transitional and OECD countries at 0.68 percent 
and 2.12 percent, respectively (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). While property tax in Kenya accounted for 
26 percent of sub-national government own-source revenues and 0.37 percent of GDP in 1990-91 (Kelly, 2004), 
in recent years its importance is declining as illustrated in Figure 1. The contribution to GDP has deteriorated 
from 0.22 percent in 2002/2003 to 0.16 percent in 2009/2010. Over the same period, contribution to own-source 
revenues has deteriorated by four percentage points to stand at 24 per cent in 2009/10.  
Past policy reforms have failed to improve performance of property tax in Kenya. The first major reform was in 
1998 focusing on comprehensive collections through fiscal cadastre coverage, enhanced tax collection, 
enforcement and improved tax payer service (Kelly, 2000b). Other policy initiatives included incentives in form 
of reduction of up to five percent of tax liability for early payment of property tax, and monthly three percent 
interest rate on tax arrears (Kelly, 2013).  
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Kenya promulgated a new constitution in 2010, paving way for a two-tier governance structure comprising of the 
national government and 47 county governments (Boex and Kelly, 2011). The county governments are however 
faced with uphill tasks of delivering services across 14 broad functional assignments. The looming challenge in 
service delivery by county governments is attributable to the assignment of narrow own-source revenue base 
which entails weak autonomous fiscal decisions (Boex and Kelly, 2011). Under the new constitutional 
dispensation, property tax will be core own-source revenue for the sub-national governments, despite its 
declining importance.  
Figure 1: Property tax share in own-source revenues and GDP  
 
Source: Authors’ compilations from LATF annual reports (2001/02-2009/10) for property tax, and Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics Economic Surveys (2002-2010) for GDP data  
Another notable characteristic of property tax in Kenya, an issue of policy interests is the large variation of 
property tax productivity across the counties – For example, in 2009/2010 per capita property tax was Ksh. 583 
(US$ 6.7) for the best performing county, while five counties had per capita property tax of less than one Kenya 
shilling1. Extant research on determinants of property tax performance is however scanty in developing countries 
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Prior studies (Bird and Slack, 2004; Kelly, 2004, 2000a, 2000b) utilize 
theoretical approach and descriptive statistics to link low property tax productivity in developing countries to 
largely weak administrative capacity. We build on these studies by using unique data set collected from census 
of 175 Local Authorities (LAs) in Kenya, mapped into the newly established 47 county governments. It 
especially builds on conceptual framewrok developed by Kelly (2000a). We employ regression analyis to 
investigate effects of population density, urbanizatin, poverty, intergovernmental transfers and administrative 
capacity on per capita property tax productivity. We expect that the findings of this tudy will contribute to policy 
discourse on property tax enhancement in developing countries.   
The remaining sections of the paper is organized as follows: In the following two subsections of Section 1 we 
provide institutional context of fiscal decentralization in Kenya, and review  rationale of fiscal decentralization, 
providing underpinning driver in Kenyan context as provided for in the new Constitution. In section 2 we 
provide theoretical and empirical literature on determinants of property tax productivity. Section 3 provides data 
sources and methods employed in the analysis. Section 4 is the results and discussions, and section 5 concludes.  
1.1 Institutional Context of Fiscal Decentralization in Kenya  
To appreciate performance of property tax in Kenya it merits understanding the institutional context and 
historical background. The concept of devolution and fiscal decentralization in Kenya dates back to 
independence era in 1963. The Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1961 was the foundation of the Local Government Bill 
which provided for the Local Government Regulations of 1963 and establishment of the municipal, county, 
urban and local councils (Mboga 2009). The Independence Constitution of 1963, also referred to as the 
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majimbo2 constitution (Rocaboy et al, 2013) provided for regional governments (majimbo) with a bicameral 
legislature comprising of the senate and the national assembly. The independence supreme law was however 
short-lived as the government continued to weaken sub-national governments through recentralization of 
political and fiscal powers (Okoth-Ogendo 1972; Rocaboy et al, 2013; Smoke, 1993).   
The deliberate fiscal weakening of sub-national governments was motivated by a number of factors including 
incapacity of local governments to meet burgeoning service demands; desire by the central government to curtail 
political merger by minority communities; and the argument among development experts at the time that central 
planning is essential for rapid economic development (Smoke, 1993, 2003). The independence constitution 
consequently underwent more than 30 amendments between 1963 and 1990 (Republic of Kenya, 2011). 
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 1969 consolidated all the constitutional amendments as at that 
time, hence resulting in a revised constitution. The main amendments included changing the governance 
structure from federal to unitary system; and changing bicameral legislature to unicameral legislature (Okoth-
Ogendo 1972). The Transfer of Functions Act of 1969 further abolished most own-source revenue of LAs and 
transferred substantial service responsibility to central government. Key services including health, education and 
major roads were recentralized (Maina, 2004). As a comfort, grants were established to compensate LAs for 
revenue losses but they were progressively phased out (Smoke, 2003). The premeditated weakening of LAs was 
designed to be transitory but was never reversed (Smoke, 1993).  
In 1977 the Local Government Act, Cap. 265 replaced the Local Government Regulations of 1963. The LAs 
operated under supervision of the now defunct Ministry of Local Government in revenue collections and 
expenditure responsibilities. The local government Act empowered the minister for local government to 
establish, vary boundary, or even dissolve the LAs (Maina, 2004). There were a total of 175 LAs comprising of 3 
city councils, 43 municipal councils, 62 town councils, and 67 county councils when the new constitution was 
promulgated in 2010.  
Another important law that governed operations of LAs and provide institutional and administrative producers 
for property tax collection was the Rating Act. This law permitted LAs to tax either land or improvements to 
land. However, in practice only land was taxed (Kelly, 2000a; Kitchen, 2013).  Although the Rating Act 
provided broad flexibility in defining tax base including area rate, agricultural rental value rate, site value rate, 
and a site value rate in combination with an improvement rate; in practice LAs primarily relied on area rating 
and valuation rating (Kelly, 2000a). The LAs also collected other own-source revenues, mainly service charges 
and cess fees through by-laws issued under the provisions of the now repealed Local Government Act. In 1990s 
central-local government transfer was introduced in form of Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). LATF was 
established in 1998 through an Act of parliament to improve service delivery, financial management and reduce 
outstanding debt of LAs.  
The taxing powers of the county governments in Kenya are now enshrined in the constitution of Kenya 2010, 
unlike previously when it was provided for through an Act of parliament. The Constitution exclusively assigns 
property tax and entertainment tax to county governments. The county governments are also mandated to charge 
user fees for services rendered. To mobilize own-source revenues, the county governments are empowered to 
enact local legislations through county assembly laws. The national-county government transfers under the new 
constitutional dispensation are in two levels. The first level takes form of vertical transfer, in which the 
Constitution provides that at least 15 percent of all audited revenue collected by the national government shall be 
allocated to county governments. The second level comprise of horizontal equitable share in which the 
allocations from the national government is equitably shared among the 47 county governments. The constitution 
also establishes the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) to provide recommendations on the basis and 
formula for equitable revenue sharing, both vertically and horizontally. CRA is further mandated to provide 
recommendations on revenue enhancing strategies for both the national and county governments.  
1.2 Rationale for Fiscal Decentralization  
Fiscal decentralization, defined as transfer of taxing and expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments 
(Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999) have recently become momentous governance topic in developing countries 
(Dick-Sagoe, 2012). The growing trends of fiscal decentralization among developing countries is attributable to 
failure of centralized planning to realize envisaged development goals; and growing fiscal intricacies resulting 
from international economic conditions (Smoke, 2001). Fiscal decentralization is thus largely viewed as a 
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strategy for improved revenue mobilization and development at sub-national level (Dick-Sagoe, 2012). 
According to Enemuo (2000) sub-national governments are better positioned to identify and prioritize needs of 
local communities, and thus have the comparative advantage of delivering public service. Further, tax evasion is 
likely to be minimized where tax payments by citizens is closely linked to development agenda at local level 
(Westergaard and Alam, 1995).   
In post-colonial Kenya, the failure of centralized planning to achieve desired development goals is central in 
fiscal decentralization. This is manifested in the presence of highly skewed economic development across the 
country – for example the richest county in Kenya is estimated to have a poverty rate of 11.6 percent with the 
incidence in poorest county at 94.3 percent (Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2011). The objectives of 
devolution as specified in Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 are a response to such deficiencies:  
To promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate easily accessible services 
throughout Kenya; to protect and promote interests and rights of minorities and marginalized 
communities. 
Property tax is prefentially assigned to sub-national governments given that tax base is highly visible and 
revenue is usually predictable and stable since the tax base is immobile (McCluskey et al,2013). The significance 
of visibility in this context is two-fold. First, since property tax is paid in lump sum, tax payers pay greater 
attention to how it is utilized, and therefore the government have a strong incentive to provide local services 
efficiently (Kitchen, 2013). Second, unlike income-based taxes that are difficult to discover, land is immovable 
and highly visible, including improvements to land and sub-divisions (Walters, 2011). 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Theoretical Literature  
Taxes are often evaluated in terms of incidence, costs of administration and efficiency. The fundamental thought 
of efficiency is the extent to which tax introduces economic distortions, thus creating excess burden and welfare 
loss (Oates, 1999). The government performs the three principal functions of macroeconomic stabilization, 
income redistribution, and resource allocation (Musgrave, 1959) and assignment of functions between central 
and sub-national governments are based on preferences in achieving these objectives efficiently (Inanga and 
Osei-Wusu, 2004; Oates, 1972). The stabilization and redistribution functions are largely assigned to central 
governments while allocation function is usually assigned to sub-national governments (Ingana and Osei-Wusu, 
2004; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). The argument for centralization of stabilization function hinges 
on the premise that sub-national governments are small and have little effect on macro environment (Rossi and 
Dafflon, 2002; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Redistribution policies are best suited for the national 
government because mobility of the rich and the poor across sub-national jurisdictions stifles efforts by a single 
sub-national government to implement policies that favour the poor (Yilmaz et al, 2012). Property tax is 
therefore preferentially assigned to sub-national governments because it provides relatively stable revenue 
sources (Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012) and revenue base has low mobility between jurisdictions (Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad, 2012).  
Property tax productivity is a function of both policy and administrative variables (Kelly, 2000a, 2013; 
Supelveda and Martizez-Vazquez, 2011). Policy variables include tax base definition, valuation standards, tax 
rates and enforcement provisions; while administrative variables comprise completeness of fiscal cadastre, 
valuation accuracy, collection and enforcement capacities (Kelly, 2000a, 2013; Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2011). There is increasing consensus among property tax scholars that the major problem of enhancing 
performance of property tax in developing countries is poor administrations in updating fiscal cadastre, 
unnecessary exemptions, collection and enforcement capacities, thus stifling statutory tax policy (Kelly, 2000a; 
2000b; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). While policy variables with respect to tax base definitions and 
tax rates determine revenue yield, quality of administration will determine the extent to which tax base is 
captured in fiscal cadastre, accuracy of property valuations, and the extent to which tax bills are collected (Kelly, 
2013).  
2.2 Empirical Literature  
There are two strands of empirical literature on determinants of property tax performance. The first strand, uses 
descriptive statistics; for example by assessing proportion of property that is captured on tax rolls, or proportion 
of propter tax in GDP and linking the observations to theoretical propositions. Generally this strand of literature 
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hints at administration challenges as critical factors for low property tax productivity in developing and transition 
countries (Bird and Slack, 2004; Kelly, 200a, 2000b; Smoke, 1993, 2003). The challenges stifling property tax 
productivity is acute in developing countries, mainly attributable to obsolete or incomplete fiscal cadastre (Kelly, 
200a, 2000b, 2013; Rocaboy et al, 2013; World Bank, 2002) unnecessary exemptions contrary to provisions of 
legal framework, inadequate capacities of sub-national governments to maintain fiscal cadastre information 
(Kelly, 2000a, 2013) and weak political will (Kelly, 200a, 2013; Smoke, 2003; World Bank, 2002). Weak 
political will particularly in developing countries can be linked to the fact that the wealthy citizens who have 
political influence own most of the properties (Fjeldstad and Heggstad, 2012).The administration challenges 
stifling property tax productivity is a key characteristics of developing countries (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2007; Kelly, 2000a, 2013; McCluskey et al, 2013; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011).  
Lack of tax payer faith in utilization of revenues and equity of the tax system, high compliance costs, lack of 
enforcement measures, cultural attitude expecting free services from the government, complexities in 
understanding tax system and payment procedures (Kelly, 2013) also impede property tax productivity. Poor 
service delivery and corruption adversely affects tax payers perception of exploitation, thus promoting resistance 
incidences (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000; Fjeldstad, 2001; Kelly, 2013). Ambiguous property rights and 
inadequate formal property markets which have implications for enforcement and valuation further impede 
property tax yield especially in developing countries (McCluskey et al, 2013). 
The second strand of empirical literature utilizes regression analysis (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007; 
Portnovet et al, 2001; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011) and is less common than the former approach, 
possibly due to scarcity of relevant micro data. Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) in a study of Latin 
American countries find negative effects of current per capita intergovernmental transfers on property tax 
collections per capita in Brazil and Peru. Their findings signal potential disincentive effects of intergovernmental 
revenue transfers on property tax collections; but they caution their findings against potential endogeneity arising 
from simultaneity bias. Their findings also suggest positive effects of revenue autonomy (measured by ratio of 
own taxes to total revenues for sub-national governments) on property tax collections.  
Portnovet et al (2001) in a study in Israel and using multiple regression analysis establish that per capita property 
tax collected by local authorities is positively affected by population size, average monthly wage, and incidence 
of a local authority predominantly occupied by Jews. They also establish that increasing distance to the nearest 
major town negatively affects per capita property tax collected. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) using a 
three-year panel data of 70 developing countries establish positive effects of level of fiscal decentralization, 
measured as ratio of sub-national government expenditure to total government expenditure, on property tax 
revenue use. Even after controlling for possible endogeneity bias, they establish the effects to be statistically 
significant. They also find higher level of urbanization, GDP per capita and population growth rate to positively 
affect property tax mobilization. However, they find country population size to be negatively related to property 
tax collection.  
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Data 
The data on property tax, number of personnel and transfers from the national government was obtained from the 
2009/2010 Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) annual report; while those on poverty, population density, 
and urbanization was compiled from the Commission on Revenue Allocation (2013) County Fact Sheet.  
3.2 Estimation Method and Empirical Model 
We employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate effects of the explanatory variables on property tax 
performance, measured on per capita basis. The data for the 175 LAs was mapped into respective counties and 
aggregated. The following empirical model was estimated:- 
Percaptaxi = β0 + β1pop_densityi + β2povertyi + β3urban_popi + β4percap_latfi + β5no_personneli + ei  
Following Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011), we use per capita property tax revenue (percaptax) as the 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables include county population density (pop_density); county poverty 
rates in percent (poverty); county urbanization in percent (urban_pop); per capita central government transfer 
(percap_latf); and the number of county LAs personnel (no_personnel) to proxy for administrative capacity. 
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Population density was included because higher population density is expected to positively affect property 
market values and hence the tax base. Poverty rate was used as a proxy for level of county development and 
hence ability to pay which may affect political will and the degree of enforcement by authorities. Moreover, poor 
service delivery may increase tax payer resistance (Kelly, 2013; Fjeldstad, 2001), and poverty may result largely 
from skewed public investments (Republic of Kenya, 2011). Urban population may affect property tax yield due 
to higher values of tax base resulting from high demand in urban areas. Further, share of urban population is 
likely to affect differently size and composition of tax base in urban and rural areas (Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2011). Central government transfer, measured by per capita LATF was included to establish whether 
such transfers have disincentive effects on property tax collections. High levels of external resources to 
supplement local revenues may diminish incentives to optimize local taxes by sub-national governments leading 
to free rider problem (Bräutigam and Botchwey, 1999). Number of LAs personnel proxy for administrative 
capacity, and thus counties with higher number of LAs personnel are expected to enhance collection ratio. 
Administration capacity has significant implications for key aspects of property tax yield such as coverage ratio 
and valuation ratio (Kelly, 2000, 2013, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011).  
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 provides comparative per capita property tax across the 47 counties. Per capita property tax varies 
across counties with urban counties including Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru leading. Counties in rural and arid 
regions including Mandera, Marsabit and Wajir perform poorly. Property tax revenue depends on multiplicity of 
factors including institutional, cultural and economic factors (Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). The 
relatively better performance of major urban areas can be explained by enhanced administrative resources, 
higher property values and clearly defined property rights. The counties in arid regions are primarily inhabited 
by pastoral communities with sparse population density and therefore characterized by predominance of 
community land with no clearly defined property rights. Rural counties may also lack formal property markets, 
impeding property valuation.  
Figure 2: Comparative Cross-County Per Capita Property Tax in Kenya  
 
Source: Authors’ compilations from the 2009/2010 LATF Annual Report 
The summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The average for per capital property tax is KSh. 52 (US$ 0.60). 
There exists large disparity across the counties, both in terms of per capita property tax and explanatory 
variables. The disparities in population density, poverty rate and urbanization could be attributed to national 
policies implemented by the central government in post independence which favored investments in 
agriculturally productive regions. The Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application 
to Planning in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1965) continued to perpetuate economic exclusion of the arid regions 
by the colonial government. The policy divided Kenya into ‘high potential’ and ‘low potential’ areas on the basis 
of production capacity of cash and food crops and directed the government to direct resources to areas with high 
agricultural potential. The zoning of the country as ‘low-potential’ or ‘high-potential’ was based on the settler 
economy, which was anchored on British needs at the time (Republic of Kenya, 2011). The ideology of the 
policy was based on the strategy of investing resources in areas of ‘high economic potential’ in order to attain 
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rapid economic growth and redistribute the proceeds to ‘low potential areas’. However, lack of effective policy 
framework to achieve the redistributive goal led to social and economic marginalization of arid regions. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Per capita property tax 47 51.64 106.115 0 582.85 
Population Density 47 407.32 883.34 4 4,515 
Poverty rate (%) 47 51.94 18.36 12 94 
Urbanization (%) 47 25.70 20.17 7 100 
Per capita LATF transfer (KSh.) 47 214.98 100.65 18 572 
No. of LAs personnel 47 368.04 1,700.32 1 11,742 
Data Source: 2009/2010 LATF Annual Report; Commission on Revenue Allocation (2013) 
4.2 Regression Results  
First, we present diagnostic tests for multicolliniary and heteroskedasticiy which may possibly arise. If the 
explanatory variables are imperfectly multicollinear, the coefficient on at least one of the explanatory variable 
may be imprecisely estimated due to large sampling variance (Stock and Watson, 2012). Generally 
multicolliniarity is a matter of degree and concerns majorly relate to the extent to which it inflates the standard 
error of estimated coefficients (Studenmund, 2005). Since perfect multicolliniarity violates the assumption 
requiring that no explanatory variable is a perfect linear function of other explanatory variables and leads to 
indeterminate estimates of coefficients, key concerns in applied work relates to imperfect multicolliniarity 
(Studenmund, 2005). To test for possible multicolliniarity among explanatory variables, Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) was computed. VIF measures severity of the extent to which multicolliniarity has increased the 
variance of an estimated coefficient (Studenmund, 2005). The VIF individually ranges between 1.14 and 4.03, 
below the threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2008) and five in case of fewer explanatory variables (Studenmund, 2005). 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. The correlation among explanatory variables 
ranges between 25.2 percent and 81.3 percent. High correlation among explanatory variables does not 
necessarily cause poor estimates if other factors determining variances of regression coefficients are correctly 
specified, including variance of the error term (Dougherty, 2008; Studenmund, 2005) and the best remedy is to 
do nothing if t-scores are not decreased to the point of insignificance (Studenmund, 2005).    
  Table 2: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables  
 Pop_density poverty Urban_pop Percap_latf no_personnel 
Pop_density 1.0000     
Poverty -0.3330 1.0000    
Urban_pop 0.7897 -0.3172 1.0000   
Percap_latf 0.7148   -0.2639 0.8131 1.0000  
No_personnel 0.7022 -0.2516 0.5627 0.5004 1.0000 
Source: Authors’ calculations  
To control for possible heteroskedasticiy of residuals (Whites p-value=0.06) we use robust standard errors as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2013). Table 3 shows the regression results. The coefficients of county population 
density, urbanization and number of LAs personnel (proxy for administration capacity) are statistically 
significant and positive. The coefficient of poverty is however negative as expected but is insignificant while the 
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coefficient of per capita LATF transfer is positive and insignificant. The implications of the results point at the 
theoretical postulations that the main constraint to property tax collections in developing countries is 
administrative challenges. Densely populated and urban areas are also likely to have formal property rights, and 
easily identifiable market prices guiding in valuations. Counties with lower population densities and urbanization 
have lower per capita property tax, possibly due to limited formal property markets, low property values and 
relatively higher administrative costs in monitoring compliance and updating fiscal cadastres. Counties with 
higher administrative capacity as proxied by LAs personnel have higher per capita property tax, which can be 
explained by advantages accruing from human resources in updating fiscal cadastre, monitoring compliance and 
enforcement.  
Table 3: Regression Results 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic 
   
Population Density (pop_density) 0.0348** 
(0.0163) 
2.14 
County Poverty Rate (poverty) -0.00364 
(0.265) 
-0.01 
County Urbanization (urban_pop) 2.351*** 
(0.821) 
2.86 
County Per Capita LATF Transfer (percap_latf) 0.0511 
(0.101) 
0.51 
County total LAs personnel (no_ personnel) 0.0172*** 
(0.00375) 
4.59 
Constant -40.09* 
(20.00) 
-2.00 
   
Observations 47 
R-squared 0.887 
F(5, 41) 2,892.82 
Prob.>F 0.0000 
Source: Authors’ compilation. Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5. Conclusion  
This study has established that property tax performance across Kenyan counties is explained by urbanization, 
population density and administrative capacity. Adequate own-source revenue is a precondition for successful 
fiscal decentralization, and declining performance of property tax in Kenya is of immense policy interests. In 
light of immobility of tax base, predictability of revenues and high visibility, property tax is both in theory and 
practice principally assigned to sub-national governments. Compared to both global and developing countries 
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averages, Kenya performs poorly in property tax productivity, and there exists great disparities across the 
counties. The results of this study have implications for developing countries. First, the design of horizontal 
revenue sharing should take into account capacity to generate own revenues from property tax, based on 
urbanization and population density variables. Second, enhancing administrative capacity of sub-national 
governments is paramount in mobilizing property tax revenues.  
There exists opportunities for future research to extend the current work. Due to data limitations we have not 
controlled for some policy and administrative variables which may prove to be important in explaining property 
tax performance across Kenyan counties. We hope as the Kenyan counties continue to position themselves, data 
on some interesting variables can be collected through surveys of the counties. As postulated by theoretical 
literature, property tax performance may be affected by various policy and administrative variables. Some of the 
policy variables suggested by theories include enforcement provisions, tax rate structures and valuation 
standards; while administrative variables include tax payer services, completeness of fiscal cadastre, and 
accuracy of valuations. Future research can extend current work by investigating some of these policy and 
administrative variables on property tax performance and their relative importance. Future research should also 
consider utilizing longitudinal data to glean dynamic relationships which may not be apparent in cross-sectional 
analysis.  
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